these countries there was, if anything, an acceleration in absolute reductions in the birth rate and hence an even more rapid rate of decline in the birth rate at the later stages than is implied in the data for linear regressions.
The data in Table 3 less firmly support the proposition that the higher the birth rate at the onset of transition, the more rapid the decline. They do, however, clearly suggest that a high birth rate at onset is not in itself a barrier to rapid transition.
The data in Tables 1-3 refer to the crude birth rate and not to measures of fertility standardized for the age structure of the population. Because of the lack of data, detailed comparisons such as those given in Table 3 are not readily available for more refined measures. Gross reproduction rates* for a few representative countries are shown in Figure 1, which illustrates (a) the
GROSS REPRODUCTION RATES FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
Figure 1. Gross reproduction rates for selected countries.
Sources: Unless otherwise noted, data up to 1930, (16); more recent data, (17) and later issues; for Japan, 1920 and 1925, (18); for Puerto Rico 1940-1950, corrected for underregistration, (19); for Bulgaria and Hungary, data are for territory of date.
absence of a family planning program is conservative and may well exaggerate the apparent program effect by understating the decline to be expected.
Technically defined as the average number of daughters that would be born to hypothetical female cohort if subject to current age-specific fertility rates and zerore 1960. Experience of areas apparently entering the transition since 1960 is too brief to form firm judgments, but there is no reason to believe that progress will be slower in these areas. Among constituent republics of the U.S.S.R., for example, there have been major declines since 1960 at different levels in the transition.t